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COMMUNITY, HOME, AND THE RESIDENTIAL TENANT
BLAIR CAMERON STONEt
The law governing the relationship between landlords and ten-
ants-a set of common law rules that remained relatively constant for
several centuries'-has undergone substantial judicial and legislative
revision over the last two decades.' Nevertheless, the tenant today is
still regarded as the temporary user of a dwelling belonging to her
landlord. The landlord may select her tenants on whatever basis she
pleases (within the confines of civil rights statutes),3 control her tenants'
use of the leased premises,4 and oust her tenants "for any reason or no
reason at all" at the end of the lease term.5
In this Comment, I take the view that traditional landlord-tenant
law permits the acquisition of shelter but denies the acquisition of a
home. The home is the locus from which the individual establishes her
connection to the community. To the extent that the tenant is unable to
select her home, to use it in ways that reflect and express her personal-
ity, and to feel secure in her tenure, her ability to be a member of her
community is curtailed. If we value community, our law should not
hinder participation in the community by any group, including tenants.
In turn, the allocation of property rights recognized by our legal system
should reflect the fact of our interdependence, that is, our need for
community.
Perhaps a warning is in order: this is not a Comment on landlord-
tenant law. I do not present an exhaustive and detailed picture of what
t A.B. 1982, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D. Candidate 1986, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania.' See R. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT at v (1980
& Supp. 1985).
2 See id. See generally Berger, The New Residential Tenancy Law-Are Land-
lords Public Utilities?, 60 NEB. L. REV. 707 (1981); Glendon, The Transformation of
American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 B.C.L. REv. 503 (1982); Rabin, The Revolution
in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L.
REV. 517 (1984).
* See infra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
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the law is. Rather, I examine certain incidents of the law in order to
describe the condition of being a tenant and to develop proposals for
changing the law governing the tenant's status.
In form this Comment moves from the general to the particular,
from the theoretical to the practical. Part I offers a theory of commu-
nity and argues that individualistic notions that deny community its due
as a constitutive element of the individual deny a part of what it is to
be human. Part II examines the concept of home within the context of
community and argues that we must have a home in a community in
order to be a part of that community. Part III discusses the restrictions
and lack of security under which tenancy exists, arguing that these con-
ditions deprive tenants of a true home and therefore of a true place in
the community. Finally, Part IV analyzes the elements of ownership in
a rental unit and describes how the rights attached to those elements
could be allocated in a legal system that encouraged full community
membership for tenants. The suggested division of rights grows out of
the idea that one's rights in property can and should be determined by
the function served by that property.
I. A THEORY OF COMMUNITY
Few would argue with the assertion that the human species is a
social species, 6 that sociality is a necessity of human existence-in
short, that "[t]here is nothing natural about human life in a state of
nature. 17 There is, however, much disagreement over the relationship
between the individual and the community. There are three possible
ways to view this relationship: (1) the individual claims priority over
the community; (2) neither individual nor community can claim prior-
ity over the other; and (3) the community claims priority over the indi-
vidual. The labels that seem to fit these possibilities are individualism,
' See, e.g., V. McCabe, Examples of Biological and Social Theory with Respect to
Differences 7-8 (1984) [unpublished manuscript on file with the University of Pennsyl-
vania Law Review]:
The biological constraint most at odds with the notion of individuality is
the fact that human beings were social animals before they were "ra-
tional" animals.
Fossil remains clearly show that our species [predecessors] Australo-
pithecus africanus and Homo habilis lived in groups . . . . Because we
are biosocial animals, our biologically rooted sociality precedes our "free
choices" and restricts the possible range such choices can take. ...
. . . [F]ree choice may involve some leeway in the kind of social
structures [we] can construct, but [will not allow us to rationalize our-
selves] out of sociality . ...
Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive Jus-
tice, 28 STAN. L. REV. 877, 891 (1976).
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communitarianism, and collectivism, respectively. Because the dominant
American ethic is individualism, and I am proposing a communitarian
ethic as an alternative, this discussion will be confined to a comparison
of the two.
Individualism, the consciousness of which is embodied in political
liberalism,8 holds that "I am what I myself choose to be. I can always,
if I wish to, put in question what are taken to be the merely contingent
social features of my existence. . . . [T]he self is [viewed as] detachable
from its social and historical roles and statuses." 9 Because the individ-
ual is self-determining and can extricate herself from social constraints
by an act of sheer will, the social union becomes merely the instrument
of individual ends. 0 The community is good only to the extent that it
furthers the self-interest of "radically separate individuals who are
fated to struggle against one another even when their antagonism is
tempered by reciprocal forbearance and collaboration."11
The ethic of individualism, while admitting the necessity of social-
ity, does so only with reluctance. Because social cooperation depends on
a shared vision of social ends, it stands in constant tension with the
priority of the individual, whose freedom to choose her own ends must
remain inviolate.12 The community is thus "a second-order and derived
8 See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 155 (1975). The consciousness of
individualism extends, of course, beyond our political theory; indeed, "[i]ndividualism
lies at the very core of American culture." R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A.
SWIDLER & S. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT
IN AMERICAN LIFE 142 (1985) [hereinafter cited as R. BELLAH]. Habits of the Heart
is, in part, a fascinating sociological study of the question "whether an individualism in
which the self has become the main form of reality can really be sustained." Id. at 143.
In response, the authors suggest that "perhaps only the civic and biblical forms of
individualism-forms that see the individual in relation to a larger whole, a community
and a tradition-are capable of sustaining genuine individuality and nurturing both
public and private life." Id.
9 A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 220-21 (2d ed. 1984).
10 See M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 148 (1982). Sandel
argues that John Rawls' attempt to moderate the instrumental view of community by
allowing partial internalization of the community by the individual fails to support his
argument that the assets of individuals should be shared with society; only if society is
viewed as constitutive of the individual can assets be held in common or fates be shared.
See id. at 147-52 (discussing J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 520-29 (1971)).
t R. UNGER, supra note 8, at 155; see also R. BELLAH, supra note 8, at 143:
In seventeenth-century England, a radical philosophical defense of in-
dividual rights emerged . . . . [I]t consciously started with the biological
individual in a "state of nature" and derived a social order from the ac-
tions of such individuals . . . .John Locke is the key figure and one
enormously influential in America. The essence of the Lockean position is
an almost ontological individualism. The individual is prior to society,
which comes into existence only through the voluntary contract of individ-
uals trying to maximize their own self-interest.
12 See R. UNGER, supra note 8, at 155.
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phenomenon that is primarily regarded as restricting the individual's
autonomy and as warping [her] deepest nature."13
This, to be sure, is the picture of individualism painted by its crit-
ics, but the conclusion that the first-order phenomenon is the individual
is logically unavoidable as soon as the individual is identified as the sole
and proper source of her own being and destiny. If the good for the
individual consists of self-determination, it cannot consist of social de-
termination except to the extent that the individual will and the social
will coincide, and to the extent that they do coincide, one's individuated
status is threatened.14
But what if self-determination in the individualistic sense is itself
an impossibility? What if "the social and communal aspects of human
life are the necessary environment for the flourishing of essential
human capacities"?5 What if we "are embedded in language, history,
and culture, which are social creations, [so that] there can be no such
thing as a person without society"?"6 From these questions the commu-
nitarian ethic is derived. Is it not true that
we are never more (and sometimes less) than the co-authors
of our own narratives[?] Only in fantasy do we live what
story we please. In life . . . we are always under certain
constraints. We enter upon a stage which we did not design
and we find ourselves part of an action that was not of our
making. Each of us being a main character in his own
drama plays subordinate parts in the dramas of others, and
each drama constrains the others.
1 7
If "there can be no person without society," and because there can be
no society without people, it makes no sense to say that one must come
before the other, physically or metaphysically. Any attempt at priori-
tization leads to a conundrum analogous to that of the chicken and the
egg.
JS . FRIEDMANN, THE GOOD SOCIETY 84 (1979).
14 See R. UNGER, supra note 8, at 215 ("[Tlhe more intimate the similarity of
experience and reflection among individuals, the less of a basis does individual identity
seem to have.").
"5 Grey, supra note 7, at 891 n.39.
10 Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 965 (1982) (footnote
omitted). As Hannah Arendt pointed out, "[T]he Romans . . . used the words 'to live'
and 'to be among men' (inter homines esse) or 'to die' and 'to cease to be among men'
(inter homines esse desinere) as synonyms." H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 7-
8 (1958). Arendt herself argues that "[n]o human life, not even the life of the hermit in
nature's wilderness, is possible without a world which directly or indirectly testifies to
the presence of other human beings." Id. at 22.
17 A. MACINTYRE, supra note 9, at 213.
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While denying the premises of individualism, communitarianism
does not deny individuality."8 Each member of the species is unique in
both her physical embodiment and her consciousness, 9 but she is not
the sole author of her uniqueness. Unless we allow for the interdepen-
dence of individuality and sociality, a satisfactory explanation of what it
means to be human will elude us:
It is one of the requirements of personality that one be rec-
ognized by others as a person ...
. . . [T]he self is defined by the totality of its relations
with other . . . selves. . . . More precisely, we are our re-
lations; the way in which others conceive of those relations is
one of their determinants, and therefore one of the determi-
nants of our own selfhood. If one could imagine a situation
in which no one treated a person or had ever treated him as
a human being with a self, then in that situation he would
have no self.
20
A human being raised by wolves would be human in appearance but
not in consciousness."' Not only would she lack the aspect of selfhood
that is defined by relations with other humans (her relational identity
would be lupine), but her consciousness could not be formulated or ex-
pressed in human terms. In short, the baggage with which we arrive on
this earth will not carry us very far. Human consciousness is informed
by the language, culture, and tradition of the community,22 and the
is See R. UNGER, supra note 8, at 213 ("The attribute of the self by virtue of
which it must always be a particular self, distinct from other selves, is called
individuality.").
"S See H. ARENDT, supra note 16, at 8 ("Plurality is the condition of human
action because we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever
the same as anyone else vho ever lived, lives, or will live.").
20 R. UNGER, supra note 8, at 216.
21 See L. MA1SON, WOLF CHILDREN 12 (1972) ("[Tihe search for human nature
among 'wild' children has always proved fruitless precisely because human nature can
appear only when human existence has entered the social context.").
To Hannah Arendt, activities carried on outside the realm of social relations were
not "human" activities:
All human activities are conditioned by the fact that men live to-
gether . . . . The activity of labor does not need the presence of others,
though a being laboring in complete solitude would not be human but an
animal laborans . . . . Man working and fabricating and building a
world inhabited only by himself would still be a fabricator, though not
homofaber: he would have lost his specifically human quality and, rather,
be a god . . . a divine demiurge as Plato described him in one of his
myths.
H. ARENDT, supra note 16, at 22.
22 See Grey, supra note 7, at 895.
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"medium through which consciousness expresses itself is made up of
the symbols of culture, . . . [which] are irreducibly social." 3 A theory
of community that satisfies the communitarian ontology, as contrasted
with that of individualism, has been characterized as one that
would describe not just a feeling but a mode of self-under-
standing partly constitutive of the agent's identity ...
[This view holds that members of society] conceive their
identity . . . as defined to some extent by the community of
which they are a part. . . . [C]ommunity describes not just
what they have as fellow citizens but also what they
are . . . . In contrast to the [individualistic] conceptions of
community, we might describe this strong view as the consti-
tutive conception.
2 4
The communitarian ethic, as presented here, does not swallow the
individual. It is distinguished from liberal individualism in recognizing
that the individual cannot be disaggregated from her community, but it
does not pretend to solve what Duncan Kennedy has called "the funda-
mental contradiction" between the need for autonomy and the need for
community.25 Liberal individualism, by denying the constitutive aspect
of community, enables one to "deny the fundamental contradiction.
'2 6
Only by recognizing the validity of both sides of the contradiction can
we confront the problems of social organization with a clear vision. If
the individual deprived of community is deprived of an element of what
it means to be human, and if the good society is one that creates the
necessary conditions for individuals to develop their human capacities,
then the degree to which a society affords its members participation in
community is one measure of its success.
In the next part of the Comment, I develop the connection be-
tween community in this abstract sense and community in a more con-
crete sense: community as the place we make our home. While this part
has spoken primarily through the voices of philosophers and theorists,
in the next we shall hear from the planners of cities and housing as
well.
23 R. UNGER, supra note 8, at 215.
24 M. SANDEL, supra note 10, at 150.
15 See Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L.
REV. 205, 211-13 (1979). But see Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN.
L. REv. 1, 15-16 (1984) ("I renounce the fundamental contradiction. I recant it, and I
also recant the whole idea of individualism and altruism, and the idea of legal con-
sciousness .... I mean these things are absolutely classic examples of 'philosophical'
abstractions which you can manipulate into little structures.").
36 Kennedy, supra note 25, at 217.
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II. HOME IN COMMUNITY
The word "community" can describe groups having distinct fea-
tures that unite the members in some way. Thus, we can speak of the
gay community, the Irish Catholic community, or the stamp-collecting
community. Communities defined solely by traits, beliefs, or interests
are important units of social organization, but they do not reduce the
need for a community that surrounds one's home, a community based
on physical proximity. Community in this sense depends on "frequent
social interaction among persons who live . . . close to one an-
other . . . . They 'connect' through sharing a common place or neigh-
borhood, developing a feeling that can transcend their individual differ-
ences and forge them into a larger common sphere of loyalty and
support."2 7 If we do not know and are not known by the people among
whom we live, our relationships will be characterized by anomie and
alienation, "insecurity and hostility rather than . . . cohesiveness and
cooperation." 28 Certainly one can survive such conditions, for they de-
scribe the lives many of us lead. Nevertheless, a life of anomie is a life
deprived of context:
When people . . . say "my neighborhood," it usually means
they have found a place to live where they feel some human
sense of belonging, some human sense of being part of a so-
ciety . . . rather than just being in a society . . . . But,
then, people can just as easily say simply "where I live," as
though it is merely a rest stop on a road full of such stops,
with each one merging into the next so hazily that it takes
handfuls of old bills to even remember where you've been.
Neighborhoods are memorable. A jumble of "places" where
you've lived is not.29
Being part of a society as opposed to merely being in a society is
memorable because of the constitutive nature of the relationship be-
tween the individual and the community of which she is a part. We
remember that which is a part of ourselves:
[P]eople develop their world view and absorb their basic val-
17 N. NEWMARK & P. THOMPSON, SELF, SPACE, AND SHELTER: AN INTRODUC-
TION TO HOUSING 21 (1977). But see T. BENDER, COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE
IN AMERICA 6 (1978) (arguing that "[clommunity [is] defined better as an experience
than as a place" and that "[tierritorially based interaction represents only one pattern
of community .... A preoccupation with territory thus ultimately confuses our un-
derstanding of community.").
28 N. NEWMARK & P. THOMPSON, supra note 27, at 21.
1, D. MORRIS & K. HESS, NEIGHBORHOOD POWER 1 (1975).
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ues from [their] society or community . . . ; they form their
deepest emotional attachment to persons, places and institu-
tions; they learn as part of themselves a language, a culture
and a tradition.
.. It is true that for many persons these attachments
do not form . . . .But [this is] generally and appropriately
regarded as evidence of social failure, the failure of a society
to provide a satisfying and harmonious setting for human life
and growth. When a society successfully achieves a sense of
community, most of its members can leave it only at the cost
of losing some central part of their own being .... 30
To the extent that we do not contribute to and partake of the language,
culture, and tradition of our neighbors, that is, to the extent society
"fails," we become "mad first to [others] and then to [ourselves]."'" We
lose both the ability to understand and the ability to be understood.32
30 Grey, supra note 7, at 895.
31 R. UNGER, supra note 8, at 215. Hannah Arendt has described the relationship
of speech to meaning thus:
[W]hatever men do or know or experience can make sense only to the
extent that it can be spoken about .... Men in the plural, that is, men in
so far as they live and move and act in this world, can experience mean-
ingfulness only because they can talk with and make sense to each other
and to themselves.
H. ARENDT, supra note 16, at 4.
" In 1972, a flood wiped out the closely knit communities lining Buffalo Creek
Hollow in West Virginia. At the request of Arnold & Porter, the law firm representing
the survivors of these communities, sociologist Kai Erikson documented the devastation
caused by what he calls the "loss of communality" that followed the flood. See K.
ERIKSON, EVERYTHING IN ITS PATH: DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY IN THE BUF-
FALO CREEK FLOOD 186-245 (1976). Most of the survivors were placed among stran-
gers in trailer camps set up by the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Id. at 46-47. Although the camps did supply much-needed shelter, they also "served to
stabilize one of the worst forms of disorganization resulting from the disaster by catch-
ing people in a moment of extreme dislocation and freezing them there in a kind of
holding pattern." Id. at 47. The words of the people of Buffalo Creek make plain what
can be entailed in the loss of community:
Well, I just don't feel like the same person. I feel like I live in a
different world. I don't have no home no more. . . . [S]ometimes I just
wonder if I'm a human being. I just feel like I don't have no friends in the
world, nobody cares for me.
Id. at 214.
[I]t seemed like every time I tried to remember anything in my past, it
bothered me tremendously-because the flood in its own way destroyed
my past in the mental sense. I knew everybody in the area. That's where I
lived, and that's what I called home. And I can't go back there anymore, I
can't even think of it. I have no past.
Id.
I feel that the disaster has affected almost everyone on Buffalo Creek
[Vol. 134:627
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Conversely, the more society succeeds by "enhanc[ing] the continuity of
a culture ... [and] increas[ing] a sense of connection in time and
space,""3 the more we may realize the capacities of our species. 
4
To be a part of a community one must feel "at home" there. One
must have a sense of attachment, both emotional and physical. It is
important to
"recognize the centrality of [a] fixed place in the psychologi-
cal architecture of traditional man. This centrality is re-
flected in our culture in innumerable ways. . . .The very
word 'rootedness' to which we pay so much attention . ..is
taken to mean a fixed place, a permanently anchored
'home' . . . one's link with both nature and the past." 5
Today, the home serves as a link not with nature but rather with
the social order; it is a link that is both integrative and individuating.
The home is integrative in that it places one physically in a social con-
text, the locus from which one's engagement with others emanates. The
home is individuating in that its boundary "excludes what is not
wanted, or 'non-self' and incorporates what is psychically perceived as
'true self.' . . . [Housing] displays much of a person's interior life, in-
cluding genuine feelings about identity." 6
Individuation does not imply isolation-the antithesis of commu-
nity-but rather is a recognition that each individual is a unique part
of her community, which, in turn, contributes to her uniqueness. The
home identifies the individual's place within the community and often
serves to communicate information about her identity to others; that is,
emotionally. People have no sense of belonging anywhere. There are no
existing community identities left, only desolation and indecision.
Id.
Erikson explains the phenomenon thus:
People normally learn who they are and where they are by taking
soundings from their fellows. As if employing a subtle form of radar, they
probe other people in their immediate surround[ings] with looks and
words and gestures, hoping to learn something about themselves from the
return signals. But when there are no reliable objects out there to receive
those exploratory probes, people have a hard time estimating where they
stand in relation to the rest of the world. They come to feel that they are
not whole persons because they have no confirmed place in the general
drift of humanity.
Id. at 213-14.
" K. LYNCH, GOOD Crry FORM 116 (1st paperback ed. 1984) (originally pub-
lished as K. LYNCH, A THEORY OF GOOD CrrY FORM (1981)).
34 See, e.g., R. UNGER, supra note 8, at 259-62.
35 N. NEWMARK & P. THOMPSON, supra note 27, at 30-31 (quoting A. ToF-
FLER, FUTURE SHOCK 82 (1970)).
36 Id. at 408.
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the home may be a symbol of the self, "rather than a defender of [the]
self. The self-and-environment are seen in a state of mutual regard,
rather than in a state of combat."
3 7
"Home" and "community" are not simply physical entities; they
exist, perhaps above all, in our minds as
an expectancy of familiar things, the places, people, and the
movements of time that in their way are ours. [They form]
an accustomed pattern in which we are identified. The home
and the home community are thus an essential kind of con-
tinuity in the fluid processes of living. It is a focal routine.
Amid the centrifugal forces . . .of the world, it is an or-
ganic nucleus. Here, and perhaps only here, do we find a
continuity of values, a way or Tao . . . which alone gives
wholeness to our lives.38
III. TENANCY IN COMMUNITY
In the preceding sections, I have described the way in which the
community is inextricably linked to the identity of the individual and
the sense in which one's home creates a link between oneself and
others. This section will discuss some ways in which the status of "ten-
ant" acts as an impediment to home and community.
A. Secure Tenure and the Integrative Aspect of the Home
As advocates of local empowerment have pointed out:
Without ownership of the house you live in or the turf you
walk on, without some sense of security that you will not be
evicted without reason, that the rent will not rise beyond
your means to pay it, that the building won't be torn
down . . .no real [sense of] community can exist.3 9
This seems like a simple, commonsense proposition. If one's home, that
which establishes one's "place" in the community, may be held only so
long as it pleases another, one's connection to the community is in a
state of constant doubt.40 Of neither her home nor her community can
87 Cooper, The House as Symbol of Self, DESIGN & ENV'T, Fall 1972, at 30, 33.
B. BROWNELL, THE HUMAN COMMUNITY 77 (1950).
89 D. MORRIS & K. HESS, supra note 29, at 83.
40 This discussion is cast in terms of the common law. Common-law rules can be,
and often are, altered by judicial or legislative action. See, e.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397
F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (holding that a landlord is not entitled to evict a tenant in
retaliation for the tenant's reporting of code violations to housing authorities), cert.
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the tenant say "this is mine." She may have a right to be there for the
moment,41 but that right will evaporate when her lease term expires:42
"Once the lease has ended the tenant is subject to the landlord's ple-
nary and arbitrary power[,] for the landlord alone decides whether the
tenant may renew the lease."'43 The tenant's relationship to the commu-
nity is thus marked by instability and transience.
The belief that tenants are less than full members of American
society predates the founding of the Republic. 44 Approximately one-
half of the American colonies limited the right to vote in colonial elec-
tions to the owners of freeholds; the remaining colonies imposed other
forms of property- or tax-based restrictions.45 Indeed, the attitudes un-
derlying these restrictions were well established among the nation's
founders. James Madison argued that the "'obvious and permanent
division of every people is into the owners of the soil and the other
inhabitants. In a certain sense the country may be said to belong to the
former.' "46 Madison was not alone; John Adams, Daniel Webster,
James Monroe, and John Marshall were among those with a similar
view of extending the franchise to tenants:
[T]hey could not abandon a fundamental teaching of their
fathers: that men without property lack the independence,
interest, judgment, and virtue to be participating citizens of a
free republic. They dung tenaciously . . . to the inherited
denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (West Supp. 1985)
(providing that a landlord may terminate tenancy only for causes enumerated in the
statute).
41 See, e.g., C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
69 (1982) ("The distinctive feature of an estate for years is the right of the tenant to
exclusive possession of a defined physical area for the duration of the specified term.")
(citing Tips v. United States, 70 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1934); Willet v. Pilotte, 329 Mass.
610, 109 N.E.2d 840 (1953)); R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 1, at § 3:1 ("Having en-
tered into a lease agreement, a tenant has an immediate right to enter and take posses-
sion of the leased premises upon the date fixed in the lease, and the landlord . . . is
accordingly said to have an implied obligation not to withhold possession.") (footnote
omitted).
42 See, e.g., R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 1, at § 2:13 ("Normally, notice to termi-
nate a periodic tenancy may be given for any reason whatsoever or for no reason at
all.").
4s Quinn & Phillips, The Legal History of Landlord-Tenant Relations, in
TENANTS AND THE URBAN HOUSING CRISIS 89, 100 (S. Burghardt ed. 1972).
44 Cf. H. ARENDT, supra note 16, at 29-30 (In classical Greece, "without owning
a house a man could not participate in the affairs of the world because he had no
location in it which was properly his own.") (footnote omitted).
41 See C. WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY
1760-1860, at 12-14 (1960).
46 P. LARKIN, PROPERTY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 157-58 (1930) (quot-
ing 3 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 452
(1911)).
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doctrine of the "stake-in-society," which affirms that . . .
voting should be the concern of those only who have "a com-
mon interest with, and an attachment to the community.
'4 7
These concerns may have been heightened by the importance of
local communities in eighteenth-century American politics. "The [colo-
nial New England] town, not the individual, was the basic unit of po-
litical representation. Political decisions were made through 'discussion'
and consensus rather than through interest-group conflict."' 48 Colonial
towns "exercised power as a group,"' and when "[tihe American
Revolution broke out . . . the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people,
which had been nurtured in the townships, took possession of the
state." 50 In the nineteenth century, however, local autonomy waned;
"the world [was re-created] as one populated solely by the individual
and the State." '51
The extension of the franchise to the propertyless paralleled this
demise of local autonomy. 52 Although there may not be a cause-and-
effect relationship between these two phenomena, it is true that once
the community is no longer an important political actor there is no
justification for denying political status to the individual on the ground
that her commitment to the community is questionable. Today, one or-
dinarily does not need to demonstrate a stake in the community in or-
der to vote.5" Nevertheless, it is still the case that "the American ideal
'7 C. RossITER, CONSERVATISM IN AMERICA 118 (2d ed. 1962), quoted in Hes-
kin, Is a Tenant a Second Class Citizen?, in RENT CONTROL: A SOURCE BOOK 95, 96
(J. Gilderbloom & friends eds. 3d ed. 1981).
48 T. BENDER, supra note 27, at 67 (footnote omitted).
41 Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1098 (1980).
Americans of the eighteenth century believed in "the possibility of checking human
nature in its singularity by virtue of common bonds and mutual promises. The hope for
man in his singularity lay in the fact that not man but men inhabit the earth and form
a world between them." H. ARENDT, ON REvoLuTION 174 (1963).
80 1 A. TOCQuEvILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 58 (H. Reeve trans. 4th ed.
New York 1841) (1st ed. n.p. 1838).
11 Frug, supra note 49, at 1099. Professor Frug refers to "[t]he liberal effort to
reallocate the powers of the medieval town to the individual and the state" as the source
of the shift in political power from the community to the state. Id. at 1061.
8" "[Local autonomy remained largely intact" until the 1850's. Id. at 1108. Prop-
erty requirements, at least for general elections, were abolished by 1860. See Martin,
The Supreme Court's Quest for Voter Equality in Bond Referenda, 28 BAYLOR L.
REV. 25, 26 (1976).
The appropriation of localized power can itself be criticized as being based on
liberal individualism's insistence on prioritizing the individual over the community.
Professor Frug argues for a return of power to cities as a means to achieve "what
Hannah Arendt has called the need for 'public freedom'-the ability to participate ac-
tively in the basic societal decisions that affect one's life." Frug, supra note 49, at 1068
(footnote omitted) (citing H. ARENDT, supra note 49, at 114-20).
"8 Property-based suffrage for general elections had been abolished by 1860. See
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of homeownership is actually the ideal of perfected citizenship.""M Just
twenty years ago, Justice Harlan, arguing that it was improper for the
Court to adopt "current egalitarian notions of how a modern democ-
racy should be organized" and to declare "all others to be irrational
and invidious,' 55 noted that
it was probably accepted as sound political theory by a large
percentage of Americans through most of our history, that
people with some property have a deeper stake in commu-
nity affairs, and are consequently more responsible, more ed-
ucated, more knowledgeable, more worthy of confidence,
than those without means, and that the community and Na-
tion would be better managed if the franchise were restricted
to such citizens. 6
Just four years ago, Stanford law professor Robert Ellickson
claimed that "the intensity of a voter's interest in a community matter
is likely to be positively correlated with the voter's economic stake in
the community," 57 a "rough approximation" of which "is the value of
[her] interests in real property located within community bounda-
ries."58 Ellickson argued that voting based on unit ownership, rather
than residency, represents a "surer route to allocative efficiency" 59 and
Martin, supra note 52, at 26. After establishing the "one person, one vote" require-
ment in such cases as Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (congressional elections),
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (state elections), Avery v. Midland County, 390
U.S. 474 (1968) (local elections), and Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50
(1970) (school district elections of educational trustees), the Supreme Court invalidated,
on equal protection grounds, the restriction of the franchise to property-holding taxpay-
ers in elections dealing with the issuance of municipal utility revenue bonds, see Cipri-
ano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969), and general obligation bonds, see Pheonix
v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970). But see Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981)
(upholding water district election in which the franchise was limited to area
landowners).
" C. PERIN, EVERYTHING IN ITS PLACE: SOCIAL ORDER AND LAND USE IN
AMERICA 76 (1977).
" Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 686 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the equal protection clause is not violated by conditioning the
franchise on the payment of a poll tax).
" Id. at 685 (footnote omitted).
" Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1519,
1544 (1982).
68 Id. at 1540.
5, Id. at 1544; see also id. at 1539 (Members of an organization "would want to
devise a voting system that would tend to lead to the adoption of policies that met (at
least) the Kaldor-Hicks criterion for efficiency. This concern will be referred to as the
goal of 'allocative efficiency.' ") (footnote omitted); id. at 1531 n.47 ("A policy meets
the Kaldor-Hicks criterion-'potential Pareto-superiority'-when the gainers gain
more than the losers lose.").
Professor Ellickson recognizes that tenants do have a property interest in their
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that the Supreme Court should overrule its decisions that require one
vote per resident in local elections because they prevent "subnational
governments whose members weigh . . . competing interests [allocative
efficiency, administrative efficiency, progressive redistribution, and par-
ticipation] differently than the Court weighs them from experimenting
with other mechanisms for community decisionmaking." 6 °
Disdain for the transience of rental tenure appears in Congres-
sional debates on housing legislation 1 and in the beliefs of Americans
who, when asked for their views on tenants, gave the following
responses:
Renters are nonpermanent, renters have different motiva-
tions in terms of maintaining their units, in terms of commit-
ment to community, in terms of involvement in community.62
It may be that there is this sort of feeling usually on the part
of owners that people who rent are transient and I guess less
culturally rooted and able to care for their property or just
different . . ..
[H]omeowners . . . just don't consider the apartment
dweller as being truly indigenous to the neighborhood ...
They have a very proprietary attitude about the
neighborhood." '
The sense that a tenant is not really part of her community has
encouraged a national housing policy dedicated to fostering single-fam-
ily homeownership despite the fact that apartment living may be a su-
perior housing form in modem society."5 Carla Hills, former Secretary
of Housing and Urban Development, explained why she believed that
leases and that the value of that interest is a function of community policy. See id. at
1552. Rent and eviction controls increase the value of the lease and so, according to
Ellickson, increase tenants' interests in community policy. See id. Limiting voting rights
based on economic interest would thus create a Catch-22 for tenants who are not al-
ready protected by rent and eviction controls: because they have no economic stake in
the community they are deprived of the vote, and because they are deprived of the vote
they cannot pass referendums or elect candidates who would enact legislation giving
them an economic stake in the community.
60 Id. at 1559-60.
61 See G. STERNLIEB & J. HUGHES, THE FUTURE OF RENTAL HOUSING 2
(1981).
8' C. PERIN, supra note 54, at 38.
63 Id. at 37.
84 Id.
65 See Marcuse, The Ideologies of Ownership and Property Rights, in HOUSING
FORM AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 39, 41 (R. Plunz ed. 1980).
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the dream of homeownership should not be allowed to die:
"The family who owns its own home . ..has an incentive
to take an active role in the decisions which shape its ...
community. . . . Those same family members as rental
tenants might still classify as "good neighbors," but other
than social pressure, they have no permanent incentive to be
such ...
Homeownership provides a sense of identity, of roots
and of security, which is the stuff from which neighborhoods
are made and which protect against social alienation."68
The views expressed above reflect the notion that one must hold
permanent title to a piece of the community to be a true member.
Under current law, the homeowner may, of course, lose her home if she
fails to make required mortgage payments or if the state claims her
home by eminent domain, but, as a general rule, her presence in her
home and in the community is a matter of personal choice and does not
depend on the arbitrary decisions of another individual. If the tenant
were similarly secure in her tenure, if the property she rented were in
this sense "hers," her status in the community might change considera-
bly. Unlike tenants living under the common law, this tenant cannot be
ejected from her home. With this security she can see herself as, be seen
by others as, and in fact become a true member of her community.
B. Freedom of Use and the Individuating Aspect of the Home
The individuating function of the home-the aspect that promotes
individual uniqueness-serves the individual's needs for both autonomy
and community. As a sanctuary for realization of selfhood,6" the home
is a place of freedom to be oneself as well as a means by which to
express oneself to, and thus become known by, the community. Tradi-
tional landlord-tenant law permits the landlord such extensive control
over her property that a person seeking to rent from the landlord may
be excluded from the property entirely or may be admitted only on
terms that prevent her from being "herself."
66 C. PERIN, supra note 54, at 78 (quoting C. Hills, Remarks Before the Ameri-
can Bar Association (Aug. 13, 1975)).
67 See Radin, supra note 16, at 992. In support of a "personhood" right to prop-
erty; Professor Radin argues that "an individual needs some control over resources in
the external environment" in order "to achieve proper self-development-to be a per-
son." Id. at 957. The right to a home, in particular, should be recognized because the
"home ...is the scene of one's history and future ...[and] one embodies or consti-
tutes oneself there." Id. at 992.
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Under common law, the landlord can select her tenants using
whatever criteria, however arbitrary and unreasonable, she desired."8
Civil rights legislation has, in theory, restricted this traditional preroga-
tive;"9 nonetheless, any ground for discrimination not disallowed by
statute is legally valid. Prospective tenants may thus be excluded based
on characteristics such as parenthood,70 profession,
7 pet ownership,72
marital status,7 ' and, presumably, hair color. While courts and com-
68 See R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 1, at § 11:1; Rabin, supra note 2, at 531.
, Federal fair housing legislation, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3601-3619 (1982), pro-
hibits discrimination by landlords on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin,
or sex. See id. § 3604(a). Units in owner-occupied buildings and most single-family
dwellings, however, are excluded from coverage. See id. § 3603. The California Su-
preme Court has interpreted a state antidiscrimination statute as prohibiting any "arbi-
trary" discrimination, see In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 216, 474 P.2d 992, 999, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 24, 31 (1970) (construing the Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CiV. CODE § 51
(West 1982)), and used this interpretation to prohibit discrimination in rental housing
against tenants with children, see Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 741,
640 P.2d 115, 127, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496, 509 (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858
(1982), and against homosexuals, see Hubert v. Williams, 133 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 4,
184 Cal. Rptr. 161, 163 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1982).
70 See R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 1, at § 11:12. But cf Halet v. Wend Inv. Co.,
672 F.2d 1305, 1309-11 (9th Cir. 1982) (Upon a finding of "state action" and a "gen-
uinely significant deprivation" of the right of family members to live together, a court
may find that an adults-only rental policy violates constitutional guarantees of due pro-
cess and equal protection.). In Halet, a local government (Los Angeles County) was
heavily involved in the development and management of the apartment complex at
which the adults-only policy was established; in many cases, prospective tenants will be
unable to demonstrate the level of state involvement necessary to meet the state action
requirement of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Langley v. Monumental Corp.,
496 F. Supp. 1144, 1147-51 (D. Md. 1980) (refusing to find state action in a land-
lord's adults-only rental policy even though the policy was sanctioned by explicit provi-
sions of the county's housing discrimination ordinance).
11 See, e.g., Kramarsky v. Stahl Management Co., 92 Misc. 2d 1030, 1032, 401
N.Y.S.2d 943, 945 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (upholding a landlord's refusal to rent to a lawyer
and stating that "[a]bsent a supervening statutory proscription, a landlord is free to do
what he wishes with his property, and to rent or not to rent it to any given person at
his whim").
11 See, e.g., Terhune Courts v. Sgambati, 163 N.J. Super. 218, 224, 394 A.2d
416, 418 (Bergen County Ct. 1978) (upholding a landlord's right to exclude pets), affd
mem., 170 N.J. Super. 477, 406 A.2d 1330 (App. Div. 1979), cert. denied, 84 N.J.
418, 420 A.2d 331 (1980). But cf. Young v. Savinon, 201 N.J. Super. 1, 492 A.2d 385
(App. Div. 1985) (holding that, in light of expert psychological testimony about the
importance of the tenants' pet dogs to the tenants' mental and physical health, a change
in the tenants' lease terms to prohibit pets was forbidden by a state statute permitting
only "reasonable" changes in existing leases).
" Despite statutory provisions prohibiting discrimination based on marital status,
the New York Court of Appeals recently upheld a lease covenant prohibiting anyone
not a tenant and not part of the tenant's "immediate family" from occupying the ten-
ant's apartment. See Hudson View Properties v. Weiss, 59 N.Y.2d 733, 735, 450
N.E.2d 234, 235, 463 N.Y.S.2d 428, 429 (1983). According to the court, "Whether or
not [the tenant's lover] could by marriage or otherwise become a part of her immediate
family is not an issue. The landlord reserved the right . . . to restrict the occupants
and the tenant agreed to this restriction." Id. Notwithstanding the court's unwillingness
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mentators have in some instances attempted to justify such discrimina-
tion as protecting the interests of other tenants, 4 such power primarily
furthers the self-interest of the individual in whose hands the power
rests-the landlord.7 5 The effect of this grant of power is to deny those
tenants who do not meet a landlord's particularized criteria for a "good
tenant" the ability to choose their own homes. For some ten-
ants-parents and pet owners, for example-this may mean exclusion
from most of the housing in a given area.7 ' The tenant subject to such
discrimination may be able to secure some house or apartment from a
more lenient landlord, but it undoubtedly will not be the one that she
would have chosen absent the discrimination. A tenant's very access to
a community may therefore be limited by the power of landlords.
Once a landlord has agreed to rent to a tenant, the tenant acquires
a right to possession for a specific period of time, but the landlord may
exercise considerable control over the tenant's life while she is in pos-
session. "[T]he landlord is free to attach whatever restrictions [she]
wishes to the leasing of [her] property, and if clearly stated and not
illegal or unconscionable, they are fully enforceable. 7 7 A tenant in vio-
to characterize this treatment as discrimination under state and municipal law, it ap-
pears that this tenant was denied the right to live with a man solely because she had
chosen not to marry him.
The clause at issue in Weiss-restricting occupancy to the tenant and "immediate
family"-was subsequently rendered unenforceable by an enactment of the New York
state legislature. See R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 1, at § 5:8 n.14 (citing the New
York Omnibus Housing Act of 1983, § 64, N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-f (McKin-
ney Supp. 1986)).
"' See, e.g., Terhune Courts v. Sgambati, 163 N.J. Super. 218, 223, 394 A.2d
416, 418 (Bergen County Ct. 1978) ("Preventing a landlord who has allowed pets in
the past from prohibiting them in the future would not be in the best interests of the
tenants as a whole . . ... "), affld mem., 170 N.J. Super. 477, 406 A.2d 1330 (App.
Div. 1979), cert. denied, 84 N.J. 418, 420 A.2d 331 (1980), criticized on other
grounds, Young v. Savinon, 201 N.J. Super. 1, 6-7, 492 A.2d 385, 388 (App. Div.
1985); Note, Why Johnny Can't Rent-An Examination of Laws Prohibiting Discrim-
ination Against Families in Rental Housing, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1829, 1839 (1981)
("Restrictions on child discrimination also infringe the interests of renters who desire to
live apart from children.").
75 My focus is on the relationship between tenant and landlord; I do not address
whether or to what extent the tenants themselves, acting as a community, may impose
conditions on the selection of new tenants. This problem in community theory, of little
significance in a world populated only by the individual and the state, becomes increas-
ingly important to the extent that political power is vested in local communities. Cf
Frug, supra note 49, at 1080-120 (describing an earlier decline in the political power
of local communities). In any case, whatever exclusionary power a community does
hold does not belong in the hands of one individual-the landlord-who cannot claim
authority to act on behalf of a group of which she may not even be a member.
71 See, e.g., Note, supra note 74, at 1829 ("Families searching for rental housing
often find more than one-half of the vacancies closed to them; exclusion rates as high as
71% are not unknown.") (footnote omitted).
7 R. ScnosHINsKi, supra note 1, at § 5:6 (footnote omitted). Restrictive cove-
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lation of a specific lease provision may be forced from her home or
required to conform to the lease.
7 8
Substantial control by the landlord denies the tenant full use of
her home in two respects. First, she can be prevented from living with
those (people and pets) with whom she would like to live. For example,
a lease that states "dwelling to be occupied by lessees only, no one in
addition or instead '7 9 may be used to evict or enjoin a tenant in posses-
sion who wishes to live with a friend, lover, spouse, or children who
were not lessees when the lease agreement was signed. A "no pets"
clause will have a similar effect. Thus the tenant's possession is pro-
tected only so long as she lives with those her landlord deems accept-
able. Such control of personal association by one individual over an-
other is sharply at odds with the notion of home as the place where
legitimate authority comes from within, at most subject to limit by the
laws of a democracy, but certainly not subject to the rule of a dictator.
Restrictive lease covenants also prevent the tenant from truly hav-
ing a home by limiting the way in which the rental unit may be used.
For example, a lease that prohibits "any alterations, improvements, or
additions to the demised premises"'80 means that the tenant must leave
her unit as it was when she moved in. She can neither remove orange
carpeting that she finds distasteful, nor install orange carpeting that
most would agree is repulsive but that she happens to adore. As com-
munity development expert Franklin Becker has noted:
Ironically, we take a kind of schizophrenic attitude toward
multifamily housing: we encourage people . . . to "im-
prove" single-family houses . . . and yet we actively dis-
courage the same activities in apartment residents. We seem
to assume that each new occupant of an apartment wants it
returned to its original condition. People want to find a new
residence clean and well maintained, but we know of no evi-
nants will, however, be construed narrowly. See, e.g., St. Louis Union Trust Co. v.
Tipton Elec. Co., 636 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a covenant
prohibiting the tenant from making an appliance store the "principal use" of the prop-
erty was not breached even though appliances constituted one-third of the tenant's
inventory).
78 See R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 1, at § 5:9 ("An action at law for damages,
injunctive relief, and termination of a lease pursuant to a forfeiture clause are among
the remedies available to the landlord for his tenant's breach of a restrictive use
covenant.").
" This clause, which is a part of the author's lease, was added to a form lease
agreement, Uniform Lease No. 50 (printed by John C. Clark Co., Philadelphia, June
1970), by the author's landlord. The author's lease is on file with the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review.
8 Uniform Lease No. 50, supra note 79.
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dence indicating that it should look exactly like all other
apartments. 81
Presumably what Becker finds "schizophrenic" is that residences
are treated differently depending on the tenure status of the resi-
dent-after all, one's home is one's home. Unfortunately, this is not at
all a self-evident proposition; it is generally understood that one's home
is not really one's home if it is rented. Becker, however, does not see the
world through the eyes of the common law; rather, he focuses on the
lives of the people who live under it. Because we are a territorial spe-
cies, and it is the home that defines our territory, restrictions on the
way we can use and personalize our homes conflict "with implicit
norms about what an individual can do in a personal or group terri-
tory.82 Indeed, "[t]he essential behavioral and psychological compo-
nent of territory is the individual's or group's freedom to control the
activities and determine appropriate behavior within a specific spatial
area." 83 In this sense the tenant may have no "territory," no place from
which she can exclude others, for she must be willing to share control
with her landlord.
Without the freedom to shape her environment, the tenant is de-
prived of a means of actualizing and communicating her identity: "Per-
sonalization reinforces the occupant's own sense of identity, as well as
expresses it to others, and it is a way of demonstrating to others that
the space is occupied by someone in particular."8 4 The communicative
aspect of personalization, particularly of the exterior of a building,
"sets the stage for interaction,"'s increases "the feeling of community
and 'connectedness' among . . .neighbors . . .[and] allow[s] residents
to get to know each other and break down some of their unfounded
stereotypes . .".8."6 Removing the landlord's ability to exercise do-
minion over the tenant's environment brings the rental unit in line with
our conceptions of the home. In some cases the effect might be purely
psychological: a tenant may not actually want to paint her walls gray
with a mauve trim, but knowing that no one could stop her from doing
so is in itself an important element of what it means to have a home. 7
Si F. BECKER, HOUSING MESSAGES 61-64 (1977).
82 Id. at 55.
83 Id.
8 Id. at 51.
85 Id.
88 Id. at 58 (footnote omitted).
87 Cf id. at 124 ("Having the opportunity to [paint an apartment's walls but not
doing so] . . .diminishes the validity of an individual's complaint that he or she cannot
live in a place that is unresponsive to his or her own preferences. The apartment's
condition becomes a function of what the individual does.").
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IV. REDISTRIBUTING THE RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP
In Parts I and II of this Comment, I discussed the ways in which
community is an essential part of each individual and argued that a
denial of a place in the community is a denial of an aspect of the self.
Then, in Part III, I argued that several incidents of residential ten-
ancy-insecurity of tenure, arbitrary discrimination, and restrictive use
covenants-create a condition under which tenants do not have a
"home" and thus cannot have a place in, and connection to, the com-
munity. In this section, I examine various rights of ownership and sug-
gest where those rights would fall were we to create a legal structure
embracing the value of community membership for tenants.
In conducting this analysis, I assume that the basic conditions of
landlordism and tenancy-the exchange of living quarters for periodic
payment-as well as a system of legally recognized private property
rights, will continue. Although the wisdom of these conditions may be
questioned, this Comment is intended to be not a utopian enterprise,
but rather a practical analysis of existing structures. Given that the
acquisition of a private home is beyond the means and perhaps the
desires of many,"8 the division of ownership rights between landlord
and tenant may be the most reasonable way to maintain an adequate
housing supply. I further assume that, since we do not want to discour-
age people from providing homes in the form of rental housing, those
who do so should not be deprived by the law of a fair return on their
investment. A "fair return" will be taken to mean the rate of return
that makes the construction or maintenance of rental housing, given the
alternative uses of capital, an economically sound investment.89
According to Blackstone, to own property is to have "that sole and
despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the exter-
nal things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in the universe."'90 This meaning survives in ordinary usage
" See infra note 129 (setting forth data on renter-occupied housing).
9 At least one statute that prohibits a landlord from removing occupied rental
units from the housing market if she is getting a fair return on her investment has been
found constitutional. See Nash v. City of Santa Monica, 37 Cal. 3d 97, 688 P.2d 894,
207 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1984) (en banc) (considering SANTA MONICA, CAL., CITY CHAR-
TER art. XVIII, § 1803(t)), appeal dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 1740 (1985).
11 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (11th ed.
London 1791) (1st ed. Oxford 1766). The law of landlord-tenant by definition cannot
meet Blackstone's conception of property. Indeed, Lord Blackstone did recognize some-
thing akin to a bundle of rights in his writings on estates in land. See Kennedy, supra
note 25, at 335-37. "Blackstone classified estates in land, first, with regard to the
quantity of interest which the tenant has in the tenement; secondly, with regard to the
time at which that quantity of interest is to be enjoyed; and thirdly, with regard to the
number and connections of the tenants.'" Id. at 336 (quoting 2 W. BLACKSTONE,
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but not in the law. At least since 1499-the year in which tenants won
the right to legal enforcement of their possessory interest in their lease-
holds 91-landlords have not held their property with "sole and despotic
dominion." Rather, the "unitary conception of ownership" described by
Blackstone has been "fragment[ed] ...into a . ..'bundle of rights.'
Thus, a thing can be owned by more than one person, in which case it
becomes necessary to focus on the particular limited rights each of the
co-owners has with respect to the thing.)
92
The "bundle of rights" in rental property should be allocated ac-
cording to the particular functions that the property serves for the land-
lord and tenant. 93 In the case of the landlord, the property is generally
supra, at 103).
91 See Lesar, Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1279, 1279
(1960).
"' Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PRoPERTY: NoMos XXII 69, 69 (J.
Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1980); see also Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Move-
ment, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 596-97 (1983) ("As any civilian or common lawyer
should have known from the start, what we call property is merely a collection of
heterogeneous faculties. These faculties can be broken up and assigned to different
entities.").
" The idea of grounding property rights in property function has been suggested
by Professors Margaret Radin and C. Edwin Baker. Professor Radin describes a con-
tinuum from personal property to "fungible property." Radin, supra note 16, at 959-
60. Fungible property is that which is held instrumentally and is "perfectly replaceable
with other goods." Id. at 960. Personal property is that which people feel is "almost a
part of themselves," id. at 959, the loss of which "causes pain that cannot be relieved
by the object's replacement." Id. (footnote omitted). To Radin, a house is personal, see
id., while an "apartment in the hands of a commercial landlord" is fungible. See id. at
960. Because personal property is essential to human development, see supra note 67,
Radin proposes that personal property "be protected to some extent against invasion by
government and against cancellation by conflicting fungible property claims of other
people." Radin, supra note 16, at 1014-15.
Professor Baker describes six functions-(1) use-value, (2) welfare, (3) per-
sonhood, (4) protection, (5) allocative, and (6) sovereignty-protected by property rules.
See Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA.
L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 1986). He argues that "these functions implicate several
different values; and that constitutional analysis does and should depend on which
functions (and hence which values) the challenged governmental practice implicates."
Id.
In Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), Justice Rehnquist applied the
"bundle of rights" conception of property to a tenant's personal possessions, which, at
the request of a marshal, had been placed in storage after the tenant's eviction from her
apartment. See id. at 160 n.10. In doing so, Justice Rehnquist recognized that property
"rights" are mere creations of the states:
[The tenant's property interest in the possessions that the warehouseman
proposes to sell] is not a monolithic, abstract concept hovering in the legal
stratosphere. It is a bundle of rights in personalty, the metes and bounds
of which are determined by the decisional and-statutory law of the State of
New York. The validity of the property interest in these possessions ...
depends on New York law, and the manner in which that ...property
interest ...may be lost or transferred to still another private person like-
wise depends on New York law.
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held for its exchange value, as a means of generating income; thus, her
rights in the property should protect her economic interests. The ten-
ant, on the other hand, holds the property as her home. Her rights
should therefore protect her ability to have a home in the sense devel-
oped in the preceding sections. At times, of course, the landlord's and
the tenant's interests will conflict. 4 In such cases the tenant should pre-
vail up to the point at which the landlord's reversionary interest will be
harmed or her rate of return dips below the "fair" level.
Favoring the tenant's rights in her home over the landlord's rights
to maximize her profit is justified on the ground that a denial of home
is a denial of community membership, which in turn is a denial of a
constitutive part of the self. In contrast, denial of excess profits denies a
part of the self only to the extent that one is fetishistic with regard to
money.
With the ground rules established, we may proceed with a sug-
gested relegation of ownership rights in a rental unit. Lawrence Becker,
building on the work of A.M. HonorE,9" has devised an analysis of the
"elements of ownership" that he has found to be "an adequate tool for
analyzing every description of ownership [he has] come across." 96
Becker identifies eight rights in property-the rights (1) to possess, (2)
to use, (3) to manage, (4) to receive the income from, (5) to destroy, (6)
to modify, (7) to alienate, and (8) to transmit97-any one or more of
which "can stand as a variety of legal ownership when . . . supple-
mented by some version of [a ninth right,] the right to security." '98
Becker also lists four elements of ownership-(1) absence of term, (2)
prohibition of harmful use, (3) liability to execution, and (4) residuary
(reversionary) rules-that serve as limits on the rights listed above. 99
What follows is a proposed redistribution of landlord-tenant rights us-
Id. If, as Rehnquist argues, the law can carve up and redistribute the rights in a mat-
tress between a tenant and a warehouseman, certainly it can do the same with the
bundle of rights in a rental unit.
"' There is, of course, another set of interests that may conflict: those of the vari-
ous tenants in a building. One tenant's exercise of control over her environment-for
example, the holding of rock concerts on her balcony-may deprive her neighbors of
the enjoyment of their homes. Although tenant/tenant conflicts are not the subject of
this essay, as a general matter tenants whose practices cause misery to those around
them should be required to cease the offending practices or face eviction: the age-old
proposition that one may not use one's property to harm another. See, e.g., Vaughan v.
Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837).
" HonorS, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107 (A. Guest ed.
1961).
"' Becker, The Moral Basis of Property Rights, in PROPERTY: NoMos XXII,
supra note 92, at 190.
" See id. at 190-91.
98 Id. at 192.
" See id. at 191.
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ing a number of these elements of ownership: the first six of those listed
above in addition to the right to security and the absence of term.
The Right to Possess
The right to possess is defined as the right to "exclusive physical
control of the thing."100 Physical control, here the ability to exclude
others, including the landlord, is an essential aspect of the home and
thus rests with the tenant. This right is subject to the landlord's right to
evict or enjoin the tenant for statutorily established "just cause,"101
which would consist of failing to pay rent, committing waste, permit-
ting a nuisance, or refusing the landlord reasonable access to make re-
pairs or to show the premises to prospective purchasers or tenants.
1 02
As such, the right to possess is analogous to the common law's "cove-
nant of quiet enjoyment," which protects the tenant's use and posses-
sion of the premises against the landlord and all others claiming title.103
The tenant's possessory interest is thus protected up to the point at
which it would unreasonably interfere with the landlord's economic in-
terests and legal duties.104
The Right to Use
The right to use is defined as the right "to personal enjoyment of
the benefits of the thing (other than those of management and in-
come)."' 10 5 Clearly the benefits from use of the rental unit lie in the
unit's home-providing function. Therefore, unless the landlord herself
desires to use the unit as a home, there is no conflict of interests, and
the right to use is the tenant's alone.
"Just cause" eviction statutes often permit eviction when the land-
lord wishes either to occupy the apartment herself or to have a member
of her family do so.106 If, however, our concern is for protecting peo-
100 Id. at 190.
101 For examples of existing "just cause" eviction statutes, see, for example, N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (West Supp. 1985); SANTA MONICA, CAL., CHARTER art.
XVIII § 1806. See also R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 1, at § 7:10 (discussing state
court interpretations of state and local eviction control measures).
o10 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1985); SANTA
MONICA, CAL., CHARTER art. XVIII § 1806(a), (c), (f).
103 See R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 1, at § 3:3. An express covenant may, how-
ever, take priority over the covenant of quiet enjoyment. See id.
104 For example, the landlord may seek access to an apartment in order to repair
heating equipment or otherwise maintain the habitability of the premises. See id.
§ 3:30 (discussing statutory requirements that the landlord maintain rental units in a
habitable condition).
105 Becker, supra note 96, at 190.
110 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1(3) (West Supp. 1985) (permitting
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pie's interests in their homes and communities, we should order ex-
isting interests above those manifest only in intent. If denying the land-
lord the right to move into a unit she "owns" seems unjust, it is because
we are viewing the housing unit in terms of absolute ownership. Once
the property in question is disaggregated into elements of function and
correlative rights, it is possible to see this situation as the landlord's
attempt to acquire a new use for the property. To do this she must
extinguish an existing right and substitute her own. Favoring the ten-
ant's current use right over the landlord's is both just and capable of
surviving constitutional scrutiny by the courts. °7
The Right to Manage
The right to manage is defined as the right "to decide how and by
whom a thing shall be used."' °8 In the first instance, the landlord
makes the decision "how the thing shall be used" by offering to rent the
unit as a residence; once she has taken this step, further decisions about
how to use the unit as a home are for the tenant. The landlord may
interfere only to protect her reversionary or economic interests.
In Part III I described the problems of allowing the landlord the
right to discriminate arbitrarily against prospective tenants. In deciding
who should use the property, a landlord's selection criteria should be
based only on those factors that may affect her economic interests: the
ability to pay rent and the likelihood that a potential tenant will com-
mit waste or create a nuisance.' 09 Once the tenant has moved in, the
eviction for owner occupation in buildings with three or fewer units); SANTA MONICA,
CAL., CHARTER art. XVIII § 1086(h).
107 See, e.g., Nash v. City of Santa Monica, 688 P.2d 894, 896-97 & n.3, 207 Cal.
Rptr. 285, 287-88 & n.3 (1984) (en banc) (upholding against various constitutional
challenges an ordinance that prohibits a landlord from converting or demolishing rental
units unless she first obtains a permit by showing, among other things, that she cannot
make "'a fair return on investment' ") (quoting SANTA MONICA, CAL., CHARTER art.
XVIII, § 1803(t)), appeal dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 1740 (1985); Flynn v. City of Cam-
bridge, 383 Mass. 152, 159-61, 418 N.E.2d 335, 339-40 (1981) (holding that a condo-
minium conversion ordinance prohibiting the eviction of tenants living in controlled
rental housing was not an unconstitutional taking of property); Puttrich v. Smith, 170
N.J. Super. 572, 575, 407 A.2d 842, 843-44 (App. Div. 1979) (finding that a statute
prohibiting the landlord from evicting tenants in order to expand the landlord's busi-
ness was not an unconstitutional taking of property but rather a reasonable exercise of
police power); Stamboulos v. McKee, 134 N.J. Super. 567, 572-73, 342 A.2d 529, 532
(App. Div. 1975) (The legislature may decide that the owner's right to use her prop-
erty must yield to the tenant's interest in keeping her home.); see also infra note 121
(discussing the Nash case in greater detail).
"I Becker, supra note 96, at 190.
109 For landlords who occupy a unit in their rental property, the building func-
tions as their home and not merely as a source of income. These landlords could be
allowed more leeway in selecting tenants.
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landlord's right to exclude others from the apartment should be limited
to the grounds on which she could exclude the original tenant. The first
tenant should otherwise be free to invite anyone to share her home,
provided that the number of people in the unit does not rise to the level
of a health or safety code violation."1 '
The most frequently excluded "tenants" are children and pets.111
It is true that both can be noisy and perhaps more destructive than
human adults; it is also true, however, that both can be a significant
part of the lives of people who have them. 12 Absent a specific showing
11o See, e.g., PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 7-204 (1983) (requiring compliance
with minimum standards for space per person, use, and location).
"I See R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 1, at § 5:8.
112 Discrimination against families with children is currently prohibited in some
jurisdictions. See R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 1, at § 11:12; Note, supra note 74, at
1829 n.4 (collecting statutes); Note, Housing Discrimination Against Children: The
Legal Status of a Growing Social Problem, 16 J. FAM. L. 559, 565-87 (1978).
A New Jersey Superior Court recently recognized just how important pets can be
to their owners. In Young v. Savinon, 201 N.J. Super. 1, 492 A.2d 385 (App. Div.
1985), a landlord who had purchased an apartment building after the dog-owning
tenants were in residence attempted to evict several tenants for not conforming to a
"ino-pets" provision in a renewal lease. The previous landlord, who had executed the
original leases, had permitted the offending German shepard, Scottish terrier, and Chi-
huahua to reside in the building. The plaintiff-landlord knew that pets were allowed
when he bought the building, but he was afraid of dogs and "admit[ted] purchasing the
premises with the intention of forcing the tenants either to get rid of their pets or
move." Id. at 5, 492 A.2d at 387.
New Jersey, by statute, requires landlords to "be 'reasonable' in their relations
with their tenants insofar as placing restrictions upon a tenant's activities." Id. at 6,
492 A.2d at 388 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (West Supp. 1985)). Based
in large part on expert testimony and the former landlord's policy, the court found the
"4no-pets" provision unreasonable and refused to enforce it. See id. at 9, 492 A.2d at
390. The testimony of Dr. Aaron Katcher, a University of Pennsylvania psychologist
specializing in the influence of pets on the well-being of their owners, established
that the loss of . . . pets to people such as defendants would cause signifi-
cant health problems . . . . Defendants could be expected to suffer grief
and depression as great as that suffered at the loss of a family member
and, in addition, suffer from a sense of guilt and loss of self-esteem. On a
positive note, the witness testified to studies showing that the presence of a
pet lowers blood pressure, decreases anxiety, combats depression and gen-
erally increases the owner's health. In fact, the presence of pets generally
lowers the rate of mortality. As to [the three defendants], Dr. Katcher
testified that one would be increasingly unwilling to leave her home, an-
other would suffer a worsening in her cardiovascular system and increased
hypertension and the third would experience severe grief, especially since
this woman would not only grieve for the loss of her dog but suffer a
reawakened grief for the loss of her sister, the dog's former owner. He
expected that if these women were forced to choose between giving up
their pets or moving, they would feel forced to move.
Id. at 5-6, 492 A.2d at 387-88 (emphasis added); see also Fox, Relationships Between
the Human and Nonhuman Animals, in INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN PEOPLE AND
PETs 29-35 (B. Fogle ed. 1981). According to Fox:
There are many subtle values and needs associated with pet ownership.
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that the child or pet in question is disruptive, dangerous, or destructive,
neither should be barred from rental housing. In the case of some pets
(for example, large dogs but not finches) or children between the ages
of two and ten, the landlord could be allowed to require a supplemental
damage deposit.
One might question whether others in a neighborhood or apart-
ment building should be protected in their "right" to live in a pet-free
or child-free environment. The answer might be "yes" if the depriva-
tion to pet owners and parents were less severe and the benefit to the
other residents were more substantial. In the case of children, at least
one court has recognized the social necessity of maintaining conditions
under which procreation and child rearing are not burdened by selfish,
discriminatory practices:
Attributed to W.C. Fields is a statement that, "anyone who
hates children and dogs can't be all bad." We can certainly
understand the motivation of some adults to seek the peace
and quiet of a setting that is free from the rough and tumble
commotion of exuberant youth. However, the right of an
adult to enjoy such relative tranquillity is decidedly out-
weighed by society's vital and compelling interest in provid-
ing housing which fosters wholesome development of its chil-
dren. As the [California] Supreme Court [has] observed
. . . , "[n]either statute nor interpretation of statute, how-
ever, sanctions the sacrifice of the well-being of children on
the altar of a landlord's profit, or possibly some tenants'
convenience." ' 13
As long as we are a society of pet owners and child-havers, tenants
of this description should not encounter discrimination in acquiring
their homes.
Pets provide companionship for those lonely people who feel alienated
from or dehumanized by society. They give a sense of family and commu-
nity to countless numbers of elderly retired people and also to young
couples-Who are childless. Pets are significant nonhuman companions and
child substitutes for many. They are always accepting, and with the un-
conditional love that they can offer, they are beneficial for a person's emo-
tional well-being.
Id. at 29-30. See generally PET ANIMALS AND SOCIETY (R. Anderson ed. 1975) (col-
lection of articles discussing the psychological relationship between people and their
pets).
.' Schmidt v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. Rptr. 840, 848 (Ct. App.) (quoting Ma-
rina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 745, 640 P.2d 115, 129, 180 Cal. Rptr.
496, 511 (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982)), review granted, 218 Cal. Rptr.
303 (1985).
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The Right to Income
The right to income is defined as the right "to the benefits derived
from foregoing personal use of a thing, and allowing others to use
it.""" This definition encapsulates the core of the landlord's rights in
the property. In most cases it will be the predominant right; if the ten-
ant fails to pay her rent, she will lose all of her rights in the property.
The right to income does, however, have limits. First, the landlord
should, and in most jurisdictions does,1" 5 have a duty to maintain the
premises in a "habitable condition.""' When this warranty is
breached, the tenant may, among other things, withhold some or all of
her rent."' Second, the rate of rent may be controlled to protect tenants
in tight housing markets from being priced out of their homes."' When
the established rent is too low to permit the landlord a fair return,
however, she may be entitled to an increase." 9 Finally, where, in the
absence of or despite rent control, an individual tenant will lose her
home because she can no longer pay the rent, she should be entitled to
a rent reduction to the fair rate of return.
In sum, the landlord should have a protected right to income, but
upper limits may be imposed on the amount of income to be protected.
Furthermore, the landlord must fulfill her legal obligations if she is to
have an enforceable claim to that income. This arrangement both pro-
tects tenants from dislocation and promotes the continued existence of
114 Becker, supra note 96, at 90.
" See Glendon, supra note 2, at 529 (citing Cunningham, The New Implied and
Statutory Warranties of Habitability in Residential Leases: From Contract to Status,
16 URB. L. ANN. 3 (1979)).
... Although today the duty to maintain premises in habitable condition is often
required by statute, see supra note 98, it originated in the courts. The leading war-
ranty-of-habitability case is Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1080 &
n.49 (D.C. Cir.) (The requirement in the District of Columbia's housing code that
landlords adequately maintain premises may not be waived; the common-law no-duty-
to-repair rule was based on outdated factual assumptions about tenancy.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970).
There is no consensus on the scope of the warranty of habitability, see R.
SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 1, at § 3:17, but "[c]ourts generally find a breach . . . only
when the premises are rendered truly unsafe, unsanitary, or unhabitable." Id. (footnote
omitted).
11 See R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 1, at § 3:19; cf. Sterling v. Santa Monica
Rent Control Bd., 214 Cal. Rptr. 71, 75-78 (Ct. App. 1985) (discussing the practice of
reducing maximum rents under rent control to reflect decreases in the landlord's main-
tenance or other operating expenses).
1"8 See Rabin, supra note 2, at 527 & n.34 (In 1982, rents in over 200 cities were
regulated.); see also Baar & Keating, The Last Stand of Economic Substantive Due
Process-The Housing Emergency Requirement for Rent Control, 7 URB. LAW. 447
(1975) (discussing the view that rent control provisions that are not enacted in response
to an emergency housing shortage are unconstitutional).
"19 See, e.g., SANTA MONICA, CAL., CHARTER art. XVIII § 1805(c).
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adequate levels of rental housing.
The Right to Consume or Destroy
The right to consume or destroy is the right "to annihilate the
thing."'12 In the case of rental units, neither landlord nor tenant should
be able to exercise this right unilaterally. Clearly the tenant should not
have this right; otherwise she could annihilate the landlord's reversion-
ary interest. But neither should the landlord be able to annihilate the
tenant's present interest, unless the landlord would otherwise be forced
into bankruptcy. Prohibiting landlords from demolishing profitable
buildings because they can increase their profits by putting the land to
another use may be economically inefficient but is nevertheless justifia-
ble as a variation of the function-change prohibition discussed above
under the "right to use."' 21 Condominium conversion, insofar as it
leads to the eviction of tenants, also can be seen as a form of destruc-
tion-the rental unit does cease to exist-and should be prohibited for
the same reasons.1
22
The Right to Modify
The right to modify is defined as the right "to effect changes less
extensive than annihilation. 11 23 Modification covers what was described
as personalization in Part III; the ability to effect changes in one's resi-
dence is part of being at home in one's home. The landlord's right to
prevent modifications by the tenant should be limited to instances of
120 Becker, supra note 96, at 191.
121 The Supreme Court of California recently upheld a section of the Santa
Monica City Charter that prevents a landlord from evicting tenants or demolishing
most rental units without first obtaining a city permit. See Nash v. City of Santa
Monica, 37 Cal. 3d 97, 688 P.2d 894, 207 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1984) (en banc) (upholding
SANTA MONICA, CAL., CHARTER art. XVIII, § 1803(t)), appeal dismissed, 105 S. Ct.
1740 (1985). The court based its decision on the following grounds: that the ordinance
was not an unconstitutional taking of property; that there were ways for the landlord to
minimize his involvement with the business of managing the building so that the ordi-
nance did not impose an involuntary servitude on the landlord; that the landlord was,
by his own admission, still getting a fair rate of return; and that the ordinance was
reasonably related to the city's legitimate end of maintaining sufficient rental housing.
See 37 Cal. 3d at 102-09, 688 P.2d at 898-903, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 289-94.
122 See, e.g., Griffin Dev. Co. v. City of Oxnard, 703 P.2d 339, 344-45, 217 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 6-7 (1985) (en banc) (holding that a city's regulation of condominium conver-
sions is a legitimate exercise of its police power and that the denial of a permit to
convert apartments to condominiums is not a confiscatory taking of property); Flynn v.
City of Cambridge, 383 Mass. 152, 159-61, 418 N.E.2d 335, 339-40 (1981) (holding
that a condominium conversion ordinance prohibiting the eviction of tenants living in
controlled rental housing was not an unconstitutional taking of property).
122 Becker, supra note 96, at 191.
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waste124 that actually decrease the value of the property. Thus, in con-
trast to the common law-which allowed the landlord to prohibit any
modification whatsoever-the law of waste would be the only restric-
tion on the tenant's creativity. The landlord's right to modify the prem-
ises without express agreement by the tenant would be limited to re-
pairs necessary to maintain habitability.
The Right to Security
The right to security-defined as the right "to immunity from ex-
propriation" 25-converts other rights into a form of legal ownership.
Thus, a right to security in rental housing would require that the rights
discussed above be established and enforceable under the law. This
right would extend to both landlord and tenant to the extent necessary
to create the condition of ownership in their respective rights; conflicts
between these rights would be resolved when either landlord or tenant
seeks enforcement.
The Absence of Term
Absence of term is "the indeterminate length of one's ownership
rights." 2' For both the landlord and tenant, the term may be condi-
tioned on the satisfaction of obligations such as mortgage and rent pay-
ments, but in general the term should be indeterminate.1 27 For land-
lords this is the status quo; for tenants it is an essential right if they are
to be free to attach themselves to, and become members of, the commu-
nity. Many tenants are currently granted indeterminate tenure by "just
cause" eviction statutes; 2 " such protection should be universal.
Were the law, within a system of indeterminate tenure, to protect
tenants in their possession, use, management, and modification of rental
units, tenants would have property rights in a home rather than in a
temporary shelter.
114 "The law of waste may be defined as the proscription of conduct by a tenant
which results in permanent damage, which reduces the value of the reversion or re-
mainder, and which is not justified as a reasonable exercise of ownership under the
terms . . . of the instrument creating the estate in the tenant." R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra
note 1, at § 5:22 n.24.
125 Becker, supra note 96, at 191.
126 Id.
127 People who, for example, rent their own homes to others, intending to live
there again in the future, would be appropriately excepted from the general rule.
125 See supra text accompanying notes 101-02 (discussing the limitations on the
landlord's eviction rights under "just cause" eviction statutes).
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CONCLUSION
Over one-third of the housing in this country is renter-occupied.129
In many respects, those of us who are members of the significant seg-
ment of the population having the status of tenant are, by this very
status, denied the full benefit of having a home both in the dwelling we
occupy and in the community. As Professor Radin has argued,
"[T]enants should be allowed to become attached to places and .. .
the legal system should encourage them to do so. '113O It is only through
developing this sense of attachment that tenants will be able to consider
themselves true members of their communities. The exclusion of ten-
ants, because of the essential role community plays in the identity of the
individual, effectively denies part of what it means to be a person.
In recognizing the impossibility of considering what it means to be
human without reference to the community, we can gain a perspective
from which to criticize those aspects of the legal system that exclude
individuals or groups from the community. From this criticism we can
develop appropriate directions for legal change. For example, the ex-
clusionary impact of the landlord-tenant relationship could be rectified
by vesting in the tenant the elements of-property ownership that protect
the home-providing functions of a dwelling, while bestowing on the
landlord the elements that protect the income-producing function. The
legislative and judicial restructuring of landlord-tenant law experienced
in recent decades has improved the status of many tenants; however,
only when tenants are secure in those property rights that one must
have in order to have a true home will they gain full membership in
the community.
129 In 1980, 36% of dwelling units in the United States were renter-occupied;
housing inhabited by minorities (Blacks, Asian/Pacific Islanders, and persons of Span-
ish origin) was 55% rented. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CEN-
sus, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT: PRovi-
SIONAL ESTIMATE OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS, STATES
AND SELECTED STANDARD METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS 100 table H-4
(1982). California has an overall rental unit rate of 44.7% and a minority rate of 56%,
see id., while New York has an overall rate of 53% and a minority rate of 80%. See id.
at 105.
130 Radin, supra note 16, at 994.
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